Mind, New Series, Vol. Frege explores the cognitive phenomenon of taking something to be true. Frege eschews several commonsense uses of the word before stating that the sort of truth he wishes to discuss is that which is sought out by the sciences In an attempt to explicate the notion further, Frege gives a tentative catalog of things truth — which for the sake of discussion he assumes is a property — may be predicated of: pictures, ideas, sentences, and Thoughts. Frege rejects the claim that truth may genuinely be predicated of pictures and ideas, for he thinks such predication requires a correspondence theory of truth, or, a theory which states that truth consists in some correspondence between a picture or idea and item in the external world.
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Frege’s Der Gedanke
We'd like to understand how you use our websites in order to improve them. Register your interest. Frege is celebrated as an arch-Platonist and arch-realist. Until recently, there were few attempts to explicate these renowned claims, for most philosophers thought the clarity of Frege's prose rendered explication unnecessary. But the last ten years have seen the publication of several revisionist interpretations of Frege's writings — interpretations on which these claims receive a very different reading.
Gottlob Frege (1848—1925)
He worked as a mathematics professor at the University of Jena , and is understood by many to be the father of analytic philosophy , concentrating on the philosophy of language , logic , and mathematics. Though he was largely ignored during his lifetime, Giuseppe Peano — and Bertrand Russell — introduced his work to later generations of philosophers. His contributions include the development of modern logic in the Begriffsschrift and work in the foundations of mathematics. His book the Foundations of Arithmetic is the seminal text of the logicist project, and is cited by Michael Dummett as where to pinpoint the linguistic turn. The former argues for two different types of meaning and descriptivism.
Gottlob Frege was a German logician, mathematician and philosopher who played a crucial role in the emergence of modern logic and analytic philosophy. He invented modern quantificational logic, and created the first fully axiomatic system for logic, which was complete in its treatment of propositional and first-order logic, and also represented the first treatment of higher-order logic. In the philosophy of mathematics, he was one of the most ardent proponents of logicism, the thesis that mathematical truths are logical truths, and presented influential criticisms of rival views such as psychologism and formalism. His theory of meaning, especially his distinction between the sense and reference of linguistic expressions, was groundbreaking in semantics and the philosophy of language. He had a profound and direct influence on such thinkers as Russell, Carnap and Wittgenstein.